Line data    Source code

       1              : /*
       2              :    This file is part of Challenger
       3              :    Copyright (C) 2023 Taler Systems SA
       4              : 
       5              :    Challenger is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the
       6              :    terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software
       7              :    Foundation; either version 3, or (at your option) any later version.
       8              : 
       9              :    Challenger is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
      10              :    WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR
      11              :    A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for more details.
      12              : 
      13              :    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
      14              :    Challenger; see the file COPYING.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
      15              :  */
      16              : /**
      17              :  * @file src/challengerdb/do_insert_token.c
      18              :  * @brief Implementation of the do_insert_token function for Postgres
      19              :  * @author Christian Grothoff
      20              :  */
      21              : #include "platform.h"
      22              : #include <taler/taler_error_codes.h>
      23              : #include <taler/taler_dbevents.h>
      24              : #include <taler/taler_pq_lib.h>
      25              : #include "do_insert_token.h"
      26              : #include "pg_helper.h"
      27              : 
      28              : 
      29              : enum GNUNET_DB_QueryStatus
      30           11 : CHALLENGERDB_do_insert_token (struct CHALLENGERDB_PostgresContext *ctx,
      31              :                               const struct CHALLENGER_ValidationNonceP *nonce,
      32              :                               uint64_t client_id,
      33              :                               const struct CHALLENGER_AccessTokenP *token,
      34              :                               struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative token_expiration,
      35              :                               struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative address_expiration)
      36              : {
      37              :   struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now
      38           11 :     = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ();
      39              :   struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute ge
      40           11 :     = GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (token_expiration);
      41              :   struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute ae
      42           11 :     = GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (address_expiration);
      43           11 :   struct GNUNET_PQ_QueryParam params[] = {
      44           11 :     GNUNET_PQ_query_param_auto_from_type (nonce),
      45           11 :     GNUNET_PQ_query_param_auto_from_type (token),
      46           11 :     GNUNET_PQ_query_param_absolute_time (&ge),
      47           11 :     GNUNET_PQ_query_param_absolute_time (&ae),
      48           11 :     GNUNET_PQ_query_param_absolute_time (&now),
      49           11 :     GNUNET_PQ_query_param_uint64 (&client_id),
      50              :     GNUNET_PQ_query_param_end
      51              :   };
      52              : 
      53              :   /* Redemption must be atomic and one-shot (RFC 6749 4.1.2): consume the
      54              :      validation by deleting it as we mint the token, so the same authorization
      55              :      code cannot be replayed to mint additional tokens.  A replay finds no
      56              :      matching validations row and thus inserts no token (NO_RESULTS), which the
      57              :      caller maps to 'invalid_grant'.  The 'auth_attempts_left < 0' guard is what
      58              :      restricts us to validations that were actually *solved*: -1 is the sentinel
      59              :      challenger_do_validate_and_solve_pin() writes once the user entered the
      60              :      correct TAN.  The 'address IS NOT NULL' guard additionally avoids violating
      61              :      the tokens.address NOT NULL constraint.  Expiration and client are checked
      62              :      here as well and not merely by the get_validation_pkce() that preceded us:
      63              :      the two run in separate transactions, so anything we do not repeat is a
      64              :      TOCTOU window. */
      65           11 :   PREPARE (ctx,
      66              :            "do_insert_token",
      67              :            "WITH consumed AS ("
      68              :            "  DELETE FROM validations"
      69              :            "   WHERE nonce=$1"
      70              :            "     AND address IS NOT NULL"
      71              :            "     AND auth_attempts_left < 0"
      72              :            "     AND expiration_time > $5"
      73              :            "     AND client_serial_id=$6"
      74              :            "  RETURNING address"
      75              :            ") INSERT INTO tokens"
      76              :            " (access_token"
      77              :            " ,address"
      78              :            " ,token_expiration_time"
      79              :            " ,address_expiration_time"
      80              :            ") SELECT"
      81              :            " $2"
      82              :            " ,address"
      83              :            " ,$3"
      84              :            " ,$4"
      85              :            " FROM consumed;");
      86           11 :   return GNUNET_PQ_eval_prepared_non_select (ctx->conn,
      87              :                                              "do_insert_token",
      88              :                                              params);
      89              : }